Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2009

CCW Ranch, LLC v. Chris Nielsen and Sunny J.
Nielsen : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael Olsen; Attorney for Appellees.
Joane Pappas White; Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, CCW Ranch, LLC v. Chris Nielsen and Sunny J. Nielsen, No. 20090776 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1882

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CCW RANCH, LLC,
Appellant,
vs.
CHRIS NIELSEN and
SUNNY J. NIELSEN,
Case No.20090776
Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
THIS IS A DIRECT APPEAL FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND ORDER ENTERED IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS
B. THOMAS, PRESIDING.
.—0O0-—

MICHAEL D. OLSEN, Bar #11418
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees
P.O. Box 937
45 West Main
Castle Dale, Utah 84513
Telephone (435) 381-6453
Joane Pappas White
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
10 West Main
Price, Utah 84501

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

DEC 2 2 2010

ORAL ARGUMENT/PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT..
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Bench Trial:
Testimony of Ross Wilberg
Testimony of Shane Campbell
Testimony of Chris Nielsen
Testimony of Cash Winn
Testimony of Sunny Nielsen
Closing Arguments and Oral Findings
January 29, 2009, Hearing
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
I.
THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PRESERVE ISSUES RAISED ON
APPEAL
II.
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ADEQUATELY BRIEF
ISSUES ON APPEAL
III.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE
EXISTENCE OF A CONTRACT, WHICH THE PLAINTIFFS
HAVE FAILED TO OVERCOME
TV. THE STATUTE IS UNAMBIGUOUS
V.
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED THE FINDINGS
AND CONCLUSIONS ARE AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDENCE
VI. THE PLAINTIFFS INVITED ERROR
CONCLUSION
ADDENDUM
Complaint dated January 3, 2006

ii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Hi
1
1
2
4
4
7
8
11
12
13
18
22

25
28

31
38

43
46
49

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
438 Main Street v. Easy Heat. Inc.. 2004 UT 72. f 75. 99 P.3d 801
24,25,26,43,45
Alf v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.. 850 P.2d 1272,1274 (Utah, 1993)
39,42,43
Allen v. Bissinger & Co.. 62 Utah 226, 219 P. 539, 541-42 (1923)
31
Allen v. Friel. 2008 UT 56, 1 9, 194 P.3d 903
29
Angel Investors. LLC v. Garritv. 2009 UT 40. If 35. 216 P.3d 944
29,31
Arnold v. Grigsbv. 2009 UT 88.1 19. 225 P.3d 192
38,42
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah, 1998)
26
Braun v. Nevada Chemicals. Inc.. 2010 UT App. 188. f 15,236 P.3d 176
24,46,48
Brookside Mobile Home Park. Ltd. V. Peebles. 2002 UT 48, 114,48 P.3d 968
26
Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82, n. 14,100 P.3d 1177
47
Coalville City v. Lundgren. 930 P.2d 1206,1209-10 (Utah Ct.App.), cert, denied, 939 P.2d 683
(Utah 1997)..
47
DeLand v. Uintah County. 945 P.2d 172.174 (Utah App., 1997)
23,38,43
Donovan v. McGurrin. 69 Utah 1.251 P. 1067.1070 (Utah 1926)
32,34
Epperson v. Utah State Retirement Bd.. 949 P.2d 779, 783, fn. 6, (Utah App., 1997)
39
Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998)
38
Glauser Storage. L.L.C. v. Smedlev. 2001 UT App. 141,115, 27 P.3d 565
44
Gull Lab.. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 936 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah Ct.App. 1997)
23, 38
Jaramillo v. Farmers Ins. Group. 669 P.2d 1231.1233 (Utah, 1983)
31,34
Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796. 801 (Utah, 1998)
32,35
Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 770 (Utah 1987)
29
LPI Services v. McGee. 2009 UT 41. f 11. 215 P.3d 135
39,43
Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App. 192,123,186 P.3d 978
25
Mack v. Utah State Dept. of Commerce. Division of Securities. 2009 UT 47, 1 15,221 P.3d 194
46
Martin v. Scholl. 678 P.2d 274 (Utah,1983)
23, 33
Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 2007 UT 42, 1
46, 164P.3d384
39
McGrew v. Industrial Commission. 96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1938)
31
Miller v. Weaver. 2003 UT 12, \ 17, 66 P.3d 592
39
O'Deav.Olea. 2009 UT 46, f 18, 217 P.3d 704
25
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse. Inc.. 872 P.2d 1051,1053 (Utah App. 1994)
44
Pratt v. Nelson. 2007 UT 41,117,164 P.3d 366
24,46,47
Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co.. 6 Utah 2d 18, 24, 305 P.2d 480,484 (1956)
32
Savage v. Utah Youth Village. 2004 UT 102, 1 18, 104 P.3d 1242
39
Smith v. Smith. 1999 UT App. 370 % 995 P.2d 14
29
Spencer v. Pleasant View City. 2003 UT App. 379,120, 80 P.3d 546
30
State ex rel. D.B.. 2010 UT App. I l l , 16,231 P.3d 819
25,28
State ex rel. N.H.B.. 777 P.2d 487,493 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989)
44
State in the Interest of ST.. 928 P.2d 393.400 (Utah App.. 1996)
44,46
State v. Chavez-Espinoza. 2008 UT App. 191,19,186 P.3d 1023
26,27
State v. Cruz. 2005 UT 45.133.122 P.3d 543
22,25,28
in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

State v. Hamilton. 2003 UT 22, f 54, 70 P.3d 111
46
State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 74, f 11,10 P.3d 346
22
State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346
25
State v. King. 2006 UT 3.113. 131 P.3d 202
47
State v. Pliego. 1999 UT 8,17, 974 P.2d 279
40
State v. Sloan. 2003 UT App. 170,113, 72 P.3d 138
29
State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah, 1998)
30
State v. Winfield. 2006 UT 4.114.128 P.3d 1171
47
Treff v. Hinckley. 2001 UT 50, ^11,26 P.3d 212
29
United Park City Mines at Tf37
45
United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds. 2006 UT 35, ^ 37, 140 P.3d
1200
44
US Xpress. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 886 R2d 1115.1117 (Utah Ct.App.1994)
38
Young v. Young. 1999 UT 38, f 15, 979 P.2d 338
44
Statutes
UT. CODE ANN. §4-25-8
4
UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1
2,3,15,17,18,21,22,23,24,26,27,30,36,40,41,42,43,47
UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5
2,5,6,15,32
UT. CODE ANN. §78A-3-102
1
Rules
UT. R. APP. P. 24

22,25,28,29,31

IV

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CCW RANCH, LLC,
Appellant,
vs.
CHRIS NIELSEN and
SUNNY J. NIELSEN,
Case No.20090776
Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION
Appellate jurisdiction in this matter was invoked by the Plaintiffs' and Appellants5
(hereinafter "CCW" and the "Wilbergs" and collectively the "Plaintiffs") timely filing
of a Notice of Appeal on September 17, 2009, from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order entered August 18, 2009 (the "Judgment"), by the Honorable Douglas
B. Thomas in the Seventh Judicial District Court, Emery County, State of Utah. This
Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UT. CODE ANN. §78A-3-102 (4), which
allows transfer of certain matters from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of
Appeals.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
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A. UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5
B. UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter was initiated by CCW and the Wilbergs against the Nielsens by the
filing of the Complaint dated January 4, 2006 (the "Complaint"), which is attached
hereto as Addendum "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. The Complaint
alleged an agreement between the Wilbergs and the Nielsens, which had been entered
into approximately eighteen (18) months before the filing of the Complaint. The
Complaint alleged Ross Wilberg telephoned Chris Nielsen, wherein it was agreed the
Wilbergs would build a new fence on the south boundary of the Nielsens' property (the
"South Fence") and the Nielsens would build a new fence on the north boundary (the
"North Fence") of the Nielsen's property (the "Oral Agreement"). Attachment "A" at p.
3. The Complaint further alleged Ross Wilberg relied upon the Oral Agreement by
constructing nearly three thousand (3,000) lineal feet of new fence dividing the south
boundary of the Nielsen property from the Wilberg property. Id. The Complaint alleged
the Nielsens refused, failed and neglected to construct any fence as agreed upon by the
Oral Agreement. Id.
The Complaint alleged the Nielsens had seen the construction of the Nielsen's
fence in reliance upon the Oral Agreement. Id. The Complaint alleged the historic fence
had not been maintained by the Nielsens in accordance with UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5, by
2
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allowing vegetation and trees to grow out of control, without repairing the fence when
trees damaged them. Id.
The Complaint alleged the Nielsen's property met the definition of a Green Belt
and were adjoining land owners pursuant to UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1, thereby alleging
the Wilbergs were entitled to create a fence pursuant to said statute. Id. at p. 4. The
Complaint alleged that, due to the Nielsens' failure to construct their portion of the fence
pursuant to the Oral Agreement, Wilberg cattle were entering the Nielsen property
through the Nielsen north boundary. Id. Thus, the Complaint alleged the Nielsens' were
entitled to cost of the Nielsen's portion of the fence pursuant to UT. CODE ANN. §4-265.1. The Complaint alleged the cost of constructing such a fence would be at minimum
$39, 600 dollars. Id at p. 5.
On or about January 31, 2006, the Nielsens filed the Answer and Counterclaim,
which denied the existence of the Oral Agreement, alleged the cattle were entering the
Nielsen property through the north boundary, and raised thirteen (13) affirmative
defenses. The Counterclaim alleged the Wilberg's had allowed their cattle to trespass onto
the Nielsen's property, thereby damaging and destroying a portion of the fence bordering
the northern boundary line of the Nielsen's property. The Counterclaim alleged the
Wilbergs had failed to maintain or repair the parties' northern boundary and, for the prior
four (4) years had not been raising cattle on their property, which thereby indicated they
had not contributed to the deterioration of the fence. Accordingly, the Nielsens requested
3
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an award of damages pursuant to UT. CODE ANN. §4-25-8, for loss of feed and for
damage to the fence.
The trial court entered its Judgment on or about August 19, 2009, which
conformed with its oral findings on the record as further set forth post. The Plaintiffs
timely appealed the Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACT
I. June 19, 2008 Bench Trial.
A. Testimony of Ross Wilberg.
Ross testified that both parties had done their own repair of the fence previously
and it had been his idea for one party to take one side of the fence for repair. Tr. at p. 18.
Ross estimate the fence was about seventy years old. Id. Ross testified the fence in 2004
was "basically junk" due to burnt and rotten posts and was falling apart. Tr. at p. 22. Ross
testified that if cattle trespassed over the fence in need of repair, the cattle would get into
the alfalfa field and bloat. Tr. at pp. 24-26. Ross testified Chris Nielsen had called him
and said the Wilbergs' cattle had trespassed onto his land but cattle had trespassed both
ways. Tr. at p. 26. Ross testified he stated to Chris "we need to build fences." Tr. at p. 26.
Ross testified he told Chris to take the North Fence and the Nielsens would take the
South Fence. Tr. at p. 27. Ross testified he began working on the South Fence in the fall
of 2004 and the Nielsens would have been able to observe this. Tr. at pp. 27-28.
Ross testified he had taken a picture of a tree from the Nielsens' property that had
4
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fallen and damaged the fence, which had been taken on November 29, 2005. Tr. at pp.
28-29. Ross testified the fence was "junk." Tr. at pp. 28-30. Ross testified the fence was
rotten and burnt due to the Chris Nielsen burning in the ditches. Tr. at pp. 30-32. Ross
testified the fence in 2005 was consistent with what it was like in 2004. Tr. at p. 32. Ross
testified he had built the South Fence from the alfalfa field on the Nielsen property to the
ponds where the fence took a right hand turn. Tr. at p. 35. Ross testified he finished the
fence by the spring of 2006. Id. Ross testified he constructed the fence pursuant to state
code based upon his experience as a contractor, which was adequate to hold cattle. Tr. at
pp. 37-38. Ross testified the Nielsens began to commence repair of the north fence in the
spring of 2006. Tr. at p. 47.
Ross testified the Nielsens' irrigation ditch was about three (3) feet from the fence
and closer in some areas, which would cause water to penetrate the area around the ditch.
Tr. at p. 62. Ross testified it was his opinion based upon his experience on fencing, the
North Fence the Nielsens had repaired would not last very long. Tr. at p. 79. Ross
testified he meant that, when he told Chris Nielsen to take the North Fence and Ross
would take the South Fence, they would build a new fence. Tr. at p. 130. Ross testified
that, at the deposition in this matter, he had indicated to Chris that they should build
something that would hold up. Tr. at p. 132.
Ross testified there is no way to determine the age of a cedar post. Tr. at p. 133.
Ross testified it is also hard to determine the age of wire used in the construction of a
5
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fence. Tr. at pp. 133-134. Ross testified cedar posts are the same as steel posts. Tr. at pp.
137-138. Ross testified an irrigation ditch approximately three (3) feet from a fence
would not cause damage. Tr. at p. 143.
Ross testified how he had repaired and patched the South Fence using used
materials and before rebuilding the remainder of the fence, the Nielsens began
construction on the North Fence. Tr. at pp. 146-147. Ross testified he first rebuilt the
fence over the section of the alfalfa on the Nielsens' property using used materials. Tr. at
p. 152. Ross testified he next did some patchwork along the remainder of the southern
fence line. Id. Ross testified the Nielsens began reconstruction on the North Fence of the
fence using used materials. Tr. at pp. 152-153. Ross testified that on the remainder of the
fence on the southern side he used new and used materials. Tr. at p. 153.
Ross testified that since the fence had been rebuilt none of his cows had gotten
into the alfalfa. Tr. at p. 154. Ross testified this was evidence of an adequate fence. Id.
Ross testified he did not tear the old fence out when reconstructing it and the new fence
was approximately three (3) feet from the old. Id. Ross testified this was dangerous for
livestock. Tr. at p. 155. Ross testified the old fence was on the Nielsens' side of the
property and it would be their livestock and horses that would get into it. Tr. at p. 156.
Ross testified that if cattle are getting out of the property it is a good indication the fence
needs maintenance, which was custom in this area between neighbors. Tr. at pp. 157, 159.
Ross later testified it was his personal experience neighbors sat down and decided
6
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which regulation type fence should be put in a fence in need of replacement. Tr. at p. 425.
Ross testified he had approximately thirty-two (32) miles of boundary fence, which was
in the top three (3) in terms of size in the county. Tr. at pp. 430-431. Ross testified the
only time he had not used government regulation for a fence was when he was just
repairing a fence. Tr. at p. 431.
Ross testified it was not his agreement with Chris Nielsen that they were just
going to do a quick repair job of the fence at issue. Id. It was Ross's opinion that the
Nielsens' fence would last approximately a year or two. Tr. at p. 434. Ross testified the
conversation surrounding the Oral Agreement was heated. Tr. at p. 451. Ross testified that
the Oral Agreement did not include standards for the fence. Tr. at p. 452. Ross testified he
completed two thousand (2,000) feet of his portion of the South Fence in 2005 and the
Nielsens had finished their portion of the North Fence in 2007, meaning the Nielsens had
completed the North Fence before the Wilbergs finished the South Fence. Tr. at pp. 456457. Ross testified Chris Nielsen had stated, "Fine, I'll do it," in response to Ross's
proposal that he would take the South Fence and Chris take the North Fence. Tr. at pp.
462-463. Ross testified the Nielsens began construction on the North Fence two (2) years
after the lawsuit was filed and it took them three (3) weeks to complete it. Tr. at p. 463.
B. Testimony of Shane Campbell.
Campbell owns a construction company that does work for the BLM and the
Forest Service. Tr. at p. 82. Campbell has run cattle all his life. Tr. at p. 83. Campbell saw
7
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the Wilbergs' South Fence and found it was in general compliance with regulation, which
was also typical offences in the local area. Tr. at pp. 84-85. Campbell testified the cost of
fencing has gone up, with the cost of materials and labor having a 50/50 relationship. Tr.
at p. 86. Campbell testified a 6,600 foot fence would cost $2 a foot in materials, which
would be $4 a foot for materials and labor and approximately $26,400 for the entire
fence. Tr. at pp. 87-88. Campbell testified the Wilbergs' fence would contain livestock but
had doubts about the North Fence. Tr. at p. 89. Campbell testified he would not want his
cows "in there with that fence between me and alfalfa field." Tr. at p. 90. On crossexamination, Campbell testified he has been friends with Ross Wilberg for a lot of years
and they socialized together. Tr. at p. 92. Campbell testified he had seen cows go through
regulation fences. Tr. at p. 97. Campbell also testified he had seen cows stay on their side
of a fence that did not appear to be adequate. Tr. at p. 98.
C. Testimony of Chris Nielsen.
Chris testified that over the prior forty (40) years he had continuously reset posts,
drove steel posts, and wired stays into them. Tr, at pp. 184-185. Chris did so to maintain
the fence to keep his cows home. Tr. at p. 185. Chris testified he would fix the fence
when his cows got out and when the Wilbergs' cows came on his property. Tr. at pp. 185186. Chris testified he quit running cattle five (5) years ago and leased for two (2) years
to his brother-in-law. Tr. at pp. 186-187. Chris testified he did not own the cows since he
was selling the feed to his brother-in-law. Tr. at p. 188. Chris testified that once the grass
8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on the Wilbergs' side of the fence was gone, the cows would come right back. Tr. at p.
189. Chris testified he began to maintain the fence less and less at this time because he
thought it was Ross's duty to keep his cows home and Chris had less duty to do so since
he no longer owned the cows on his property. Id. Chris testified that, when the Wilbergs'
cattle would trespass, he would call Ross, ask him to remove his cattle, and to fix the
fence. Id. Chris testified Ross did do that a time or two. Tr. at pp. 189-190. Chris testified
that it got to the point that, when he called Ross to tell him about cattle trespassing onto
Nielsen property, Ross would threaten to sue. Tr. at p. 190. Chris testified Ross would
remove cattle from Nielsen property twice daily at one point because there was no feed
on the Wilbergs' side of the fence. Id. Chris testified Ross would not take the time to
maintain the fence and, since Chris figured it was Ross's cows breaking the fence down,
Chris figured Ross should maintain it. Id.
Chris testified he called Ross and, during the conversation, Ross stated he would
get a fencing agreement and Chris would sign it. Tr. at p. 195. Chris testified he told Ross
he would only sign it if both parties benefited equally. Id. Chris testified he stated,
"whatever," and hung up in response to Ross telling him he would build the South Fence
and Chris would build the North Fence. Id. Chris testified Ross started building a new
South Fence, using old wire and a few new posts plus Chris's twenty-five (25) posts he
had recently put in. Id. Chris testified he did not start building the North Fence because
he did not like how Ross was building the South Fence and was waiting to see if Ross
9
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was going to build the whole South Fence like that. Tr. at p. 196. Chris testified he built
his fence using a seven (7) strand barbed fence with a post every twelve (12) feet with
one (1) to three (3) dancers. Tr. at p. 197. Chris testified the fence he built was just like
others in the county and it was common to the area. Id. Christ said he understood from
the phone conversation, defined herein as the Oral Agreement, that Ross was going to
start building a good fence along the southern boundary. Tr. at pp. 197-198. Chris
testified no standard of the fence was mentioned. Tr. at p. 198. Chris testified he felt the
fence he rebuilt on the northern boundary was adequate. Id. Chris testified Ross had
simply indicated he would build the South Fence and Chris would build the North Fence.
Id
Chris testified about the work he performed reconstructing the North Fence. Tr. at
pp. 200-216. Chris testified waste water from the Wilberg property would run off into his
irrigation ditch. Tr. at p. 219. At this point, the trial court indicated the evidence so far
showed a cow could get through anything even if a fence was adequate, which had been
established by the Wilbergs. Tr. at p. 227. Chris testified he rebuilt the North Fence in
February or March of 2007. Tr. at p. 229. Chris testified that, since then, cows broke
through the fence once. Tr. at p. 230. Chris testified he had not made any repairs of the
fence from the time of the Oral Agreement and December of 2005. Tr. at p. 243. Chris
testified that, between the time of the Oral Agreement and February or March of 2007, he
had not repaired the North Fence. Tr. at p. 247. Chris testified he did not purchase
10
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materials for the improvement of the North Fence. Tr. at p. 258. Chris testified he
received a check from the Wilbergs for their cattle grazing on his property and later
cashed it. Tr. at p. 264.
D. Testimony of Cash Winn, Expert Witness.
Winn is a state licensed fence contractor and a rancher/cattleman. Tr. at p. 271.
When he inspected the fence at issue, Winn requested not to be told whose fence was
whose in his inspection. Tr. at p. 272. Winn testified he knew both parties and was there
to give an honest opinion about the fence lines. Id. Winn inspected the fences at issue
four (4) to six (6) weeks ago. Tr. at p. 273. Winn testified he first went down the north
side and then the south. Id. Winn testified the north side had a lot of cedar posts and a lot
of wooden dancers, with seven (7) strands in place and tightly tied. Id. Winn testified the
North Fence had a lot of riders in it and a lot of posts and looked like "a darned good
fence." Id. Winn testified it was an adequate fence and some of the materials that were
used looked old. Id. Winn testified it was actually better maintained than most fences in
the county for cattlemen and sheep men in the area. Tr. at p. 274. Winn testified it was
better than 90% of fences he had on his property. Id.
Winn testified wood riders, mostly willow sticks, takes more time, more labor, and
costs more money because they have to hook every wire to the rider and were better than
metal ones. Tr. at pp. 274-275. Winn testified he had one-hundred (100) year old fences
on his property and they required more maintenance and had replaced a lot of them. Tr. at
11
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p. 281.
Winn testified the Nielsens' ditch was far enough away from the fence line that
they would not contribute to the deterioration of the fence. Tr. at p. 282. Winn testified
the South Fence was a "tight fence." Tr. at p. 283. Winn testified the South Fence had
good braces and the only problem with it was the bracing may have been too far apart. Id.
Winn testified he felt it was a good fence and it was adequate to hold cattle. Id. Winn
testified the entire fence line was "very adequate." Id. Winn testified that, once cattle
learn to push through a fence, it becomes harder to stop them. Tr. at p. 288. Winn testified
the fence at issue was more than average in the county to contain cattle. Id. Winn testified
that, in a high alkali type of terrain, it is better to have wooden posts than steel. Tr. at pp.
312-313. Winn testified the area at issue was high alkali and cedar posts would be better.
Tr. at pp. 313-314. Winn testified it is less expensive to put in a brand new fence for labor
costs. Tr. at p. 319.
July 9, 2008, Continuation of Trial:
E.

Testimony of Sunny Nielsen,

Sunny kept a record of Wilberg cows that would enter the Nielsens' property. Tr. at
pp. 335-336. Sunny began keeping the record on October 9, 2005. Tr. at p. 336. From the
10th of October to November of 2005, Sunny recorded from as few as two (2) to as many
as eighty (80) head of cattle trespassing. Tr. at pp. 337-340. Counting every day, Sunny
found there were probably 2,500 cattle that had been in on the Nielsen's property. Tr. at
12
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pp. 340-341. Sunny testified 2,500 cattle would likely consume approximately 625 bales
of hay, which was approximately $1,520. Tr. at pp. 345-346. Sunny testified no one had
burned the fence line in question due to the feed there. Tr. at pp. 349-350. Sunny agreed
that, due to the fence's age, it was reasonable to expect it was time to start rebuilding the
fence. Tr. at p. 351. Sunny testified it was her understanding that cattle owners were
responsible for their cattle and cattle owners should keep them on their property. Tr. at p.
354.
The trial court allowed video of the fence line strictly for the purpose of rebuttal,
since the Wilbergs had rested their case in chief. Tr. at pp. 375-377. Sunny admitted she
would probably not leave braces in the condition shown by the video. Tr. at pp. 381-382.
Sunny testified the law of the west was to take care of your cattle. Tr. at p. 401. Sunny
testified the video showed the grass was right against the fence, which indicated the cows
could not reach through the fence. Tr. at p. 402. This evidenced to Sunny the fence was
adequate. Tr. at p. 403. The trial court indicated there are government standards not
necessarily tied to the types of fence that are used commonly in this area, which was
important to the trial court since there were not any governmental agencies involved the
case. Tr. at p. 409. The trial court indicated it had not heard testimony that adjacent land
owners relied on governmental regulation for fences in private matters. Tr. at p. 411.
F. Closing Arguments and Oral Findings
The trial court asked opposing counsel during closing arguments whether the legal
13
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descriptions submitted at trial describe the amount of land enclosed for each party's
parcel of land. Tr. at p. 480. The trial court indicated the statute at issue says "enclosed/'
or else the trial court would not have the ability to apportion. Tr. at p. 481. Opposing
counsel argued the statute intended the length of the fence for the basis of determining
apportion. Tr. at pp. 481-482. However, opposing counsel was unable to show the trial
court the language of the statute that would allow such a reading. Tr. at pp. 481-482. The
trial court plainly outlined its approach to this matter in determining apportionment, by
stating the following:
Isn't it possible for me simply to take a look at the amount enclosed in the
Wilberg property on the north, compare that to the amount enclosed in the
Nielsen property and determine then that that is the apportionment for the
north fence? Do the same thing and say what is the amount of property
owned by the Wilbergs on the south, determine that that then needs to be
compared with the amount of the Nielsen property and that would be the
apportionment on the south, for the south fence? And those are your two
numbers.
Tr. at p. 483. The trial court asked opposing counsel whether it had the figures for the
fence boundary between the parties, to which opposing counsel answered, "[y]ou do not
have those figures." Tr. at p. 484. The trial court indicated the difficulty with this case
was that the issue was not about the total of acreage enclosed, it was about the fences at
issue not meeting. Tr. at p. 491. The trial court indicated it had two (2) separate fences to
look at and would take the total amount of what the Nielsens own since that would be the
amount being protected by the North Fence. Id. The trial court stated, "[t]hey're two
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separate fences and the statute can only be applied by following that formula for both
fences. That's the only way it makes any sense." Tr. at p. 492. The trial court stated its
understanding and reading of the statute meant that if a fence is protecting one landowner
substantially more because there is a larger herd putting pressure on the fence, then it is
fair for the larger landowner to pay a larger proportion of the fence cost. Tr. at pp. 495496.
The Nielsens argued it was unfair for a large property owner to come in, tear out
an old fence, put in a new fence, and require a small property owner to be responsible for
half the cost. Tr. at pp. 501-502. The Nielsens argued UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5 applied
should the trial court find an agreement between the parties and alternatively argued if an
agreement was not found, UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1 applied. The Nielsens asserted the
existence of the Oral Agreement and that the agreement was that the fence would be
adequate. Tr. at pp. 510-511. The phrase "based upon the amount of land enclosed" does
not indicate the distance of the linear boundary but plainly indicates the amount of land
enclosed in the Wilberg property to the north compared to the amount enclosed in the
Nielsen property and the amount of land enclosed by the Wilberg property to the south
compared to the amount enclosed in Nielsen property. Such a formula is consistent with
the plain reading of "the amount of land enclosed" by the fence. The Plaintiffs' reading of
the statute is not supported by the plain reading and meaning UT. CODE ANN. § 4-26-5.1,
which does not include any language regarding the linear distance of a fence.
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The trial court made oral findings on the record and found the common practice
between the parties when cattle were out, was to retrieve the cattle and then find and
repair the fence where the cattle escaped. Tr. at p. 519. The trial court found the Wilbergs'
cattle were frequently on the Nielsens' property as established by the Nielsens. Id. The
trial court found the parties entered into the Oral Agreement, during which Ross told
Chris he would be responsible for paying for and taking the cost of rebuilding the South
Fence if Chris agreed to do the same for the North Fence. Tr. at p. 520. The trial court
found the parties' subsequent conduct indicated they had agreed to this arrangement. Id.
The trial court found in the two (2) or three (3) years following the Oral Agreement, the
Nielsens repaired or rebuilt the South Fence and the Wilbergs repaired or rebuilt the
North Fence, with each party bearing the cost of their obligation. Id.
The trial court found it noteworthy that, while the parties entered into the Oral
Agreement, the parties did not discuss or adopt any particular standard for the repair or
rebuilding of the fences. Tr. at p. 521. The trial court believed there was an assumption
the fence would require it to be adequate and the trial court credited Chris Nielsens'
testimony that the Oral Agreement was to build a good fence common to other fences
around the county. Id. The trial court found the cattle had escaped only once since the
Nielsens' had repaired the North Fence and this was a result of a gate malfunction, not
because of any inadequacy of the fence. Tr. at p. 523. The trial court found both parties
were responsible for the moist soil around the fence. Tr. at p. 524.
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The trial court found Campbell's credibility was diminished due to his close
association with the Wilbergs. Id. The trial court relied upon Winn's opinion that the
North Fence was adequate to keep cattle in and is better than most fences in Emery
County. Tr. at p. 526. The trial court relied upon Winn's testimony in that Winn testified
both fences were adequate but neither met the standards by UDOT. Tr. at p. 527. The trial
court found that the most compelling fact in this matter was that, since the fence had been
built, the cattle had not entered the Nielsens' property. Tr. at pp. 527-528.
Thus, the trial court determined the parties had contracted around UT. CODE ANN.
§4-26-5.1, which was the testimony of both parties. Tr. at p. 528. The trial court
determined the following:
In this case we've had a civil action that's been brought but there's been no
damages that have been claimed. Plaintiffs haven't brought a claim that that
fence has not been maintained and has caused some damages. They haven't
asserted, for example, this would be an example, that cattle have gotten into
the alfalfa and have actually bloated. They talked about that risk and I
acknowledge that risk but I don't think there's been any damages that have
been shown as a result of any problem with the north fence.
Tr. at p. 529.
On the issue for future maintenance, for the north, the trial court found 2.98.96
was owned by the Wilbergs and the Nielsens owned 152.90 and therefore assigned the
Nielsens' share to be .3384 with the Wilbergs responsible for the rest. Id. For the south
side, the trial court found the Wilbergs' parcel was 240.32 and the Nielsens' parcel was
152.9 and therefore assigned the Nielsens' share of responsibility to be 38.88%. Tr. at p.
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530. The trial court was uncertain of when in the future repairs would be needed, but was
certain, based upon Winn's testimony, the fence was adequate to keep cattle contained.
Id. The trial court found the parties had stipulated UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1 applied to
this issue and controlled. Id.
The trial court determined the Nielsens' counterclaim had been unsupported, as the
testimony had been speculative as to the amount of hay consumed by the Wilbergs' cattle.
Tr. at p. 531. Further, the trial court found the check sent by the Wilbergs to the Nielsens
had been cashed by the Nielsens with respect to the counterclaim, and found in favor of
the Wilbergs. Tr. at pp. 531-532. The trial court stated, "I think the statutes are difficult as
we are sorting those out, as Ms. White has indicated. They are somewhat difficult to
interpret but I tried to interpret them the best that I can particularly in light of what I
found to be an oral agreement in this case." Tr. at p. 532.
II.

January 29, 2009, Hearing on Plaintiff's Objection to Defense
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

On January 29, 2009, the matter came for hearing on CCW and the Wilbergs'
Objection to the Nielsens' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (the
"Hearing"). Counsel herein stipulated to the northern boundary being 298.96 acres. Hrg.
Tr. at p. 2. The trial court made clear the purpose of the Hearing was to make sure the
final order corresponded completely with the final order at the hearing following the
evidentiary hearing. Hrg. Tr. at p. 3. The trial court indicated both fences were adequate
18
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and common in Emery County. Id. The trial court indicated the Nielsens were responsible
for 33.84% of the maintenance of the North Fence and the Wilbergs were responsible for
the remaining balance. Id. For the South Fence, the trial court indicated the Nielsens were
responsible for 38.88% of the maintenance of the South Fence and the Wilbergs were
responsible for the remaining balance. Id.
The Wilbergs argued the statute required a determination of each party's parcel by
their boundary and determine what benefit the fence becomes in their boundaries. Hrg.
Tr. at p. 8. Counsel herein objected to this argument, since this argument had not been
presented o the trial court before and would therefore allow the Wilbergs a second bite at
the apple. Id. The trial court agreed, indicating it had already ruled, stating, "I came up
with the percentages based upon the evidence that was offered that day, did I? Unless
there was something that I did at trial that - in other words, I'm not going to go back
through and reopen that whole issue." Id. Counsel for the Wilbergs responded, "[n]o,
Your Honor." The trial court continued, "I think I ruled upon what was presented. If
there's something in that order that was unclear, then I'm happy to look at that. But the
minute entry evidently didn't think it was unclear because I allocated percentages, didn't
IT Id.
The trial court again told counsel for the Wilbergs their argument at this hearing
should have been made at trial. Hrg. Tr. at p. 9. Counsel for the Wilbergs indicated this
argument was not made at trial, stating, "we actually argued how the statute should be
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applied since there was nothing to direct us on how it should be applied." Id. The trial
court again indicated the purpose of the hearing was to ensure the final order conformed
with the order at the day of the hearing because the Wilbergs had objected to the form of
the proposed order. Id. The Wilbergs further argued the plats had been entered into
evidence at trial in order for the trial court to calculate the boundary lines. Hrg. Tr. at p.
10. The Wilbergs argued the trial court had used an inappropriate formula and the trial
court could not stand behind its calculations. Hrg. Tr. at pp. 10-11.
The trial court indicated the Wilbergs had not argued about the size of the parties'
parcel in terms of the evidence presented, which had been submitted as evidence but not
stipulated as conclusions. Hrg. Tr. at p. 12. The Wilbergs indicated they believed the trial
court had based its calculations on the size of acreage rather than what the boundaries
added up to, which the trial court indicated was appropriately brought by post-judgment
motion, such as a Rule 60(b) motion, since the purpose of the hearing at that time was to
determine whether the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law conformed with
the trial court's earlier order. Hrg. Tr. at p. 14.
The Nielsens requested a clarification on what the actual number of the acreages
had been determined by the trial court since they were absent from counsel's notes. Hrg.
Tr. at pp. 17-18. The trial court indicated it used evidence that was presented at trial in
terms of the parcels that were presented and acreage that was indicated, did a quick
mathematical calculation of those amounts and it came out to these percentages in terms
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of sharing. Hrg. Tr. at p. 19.
The Wilbergs argued the acreage instead of calculating the boundary had a
dramatic effect on the order. Hrg. Tr. at p. 20. The Wilbergs further argued the allocation
of future costs as determined by the trial court flew in the face of statute at issue. Hrg. Tr.
at p. 21. The trial court indicated its ruling was based upon UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1 (4),
which indicated the cost of maintenance of a fence shall also be apportioned between
each party based upon the amount of land enclosed. Id. The trial court indicated this
language has to do with acreage. Id. The trial court found there was already a fence and
was focusing on the maintenance of the fence. Hrg. Tr. at p. 22. The trial court found the
statute presumed that once there's a fence in place, the parties were going to maintain it
and keep it to appropriate standards. Hrg. Tr. at p. 23. The trial court stated, "..as things
need to be repaired, then you'll divide that in accordance with the amount of land
enclosed." Hrg. Tr. at p. 24.
The trial court stated the issue of the cost of a new fence in the future was not
before it at trial, which would have been speculative from its perspective. Id. The trial
court asserted the existing fence was adequate. Id. The trial court declined to incorporate
into its findings regarding a new fence that may or may not be built in the future. Hrg. Tr.
at p. 26. The trial court stated, "[t]hat issue simply wasn't before me. It wasn't argued, it
wasn't briefed, it wasn't presented, and the facts didn't warrant it." Hrg. Tr. at p. 27. The
trial court indicated it relied on the language in the statute. Id. The trial court indicated
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what changes needed to be made in the final order, which were mainly typographical, and
again stated it would be unfair to reargue the issues of the case. Hrg. Tr. at pp. 35-36.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The preservation rule "is based on the premise that, 'in the interest of orderly
procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to address a claim error and, if
appropriate, correct it."' State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, | 33, 122 P.3d 543 citing State v.
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 R3d 346. Thus, "[a]s a general rule, claims not raised
before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." Id. citing Holgate. The Plaintiffs raise
issues on appeal that were not first preserved with the trial court. The Plaintiffs have not
demonstrated how they preserved issues. The Plaintiffs have not abided by orderly
procedure, which is to give to the trial court the opportunity to address the claim of error.
Cruz at \ 33.The Plaintiffs have also raised issues but have failed to include argument,
analysis, and/or legal authority in support of these issues. The Plaintiffs raised issue with
the constitutionality of Section 4-26-5.1 and how this section discriminates against large
property owners; however, the arguments for these issues are absent in the remainder of
the Opening Brief. In short, the Plaintiffs have dumped the burden of argument and
research upon this Court, which is non-compliant with UT. R. APR P. 24. Thus, this Court
should not address these inadequately briefed issues.
0

Any reliance upon an oral contract is necessarily determined by the evidence. See,
Martin v. Scholl 678 P.2d 274 (Utah,1983). The trial court in this matter considered the
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evidence submitted to it and determined the existence of the Oral Agreement. The
Nielsens also testified to and agreed to its existence. Thus, viewed as a whole, the
evidence shows the existence of the Oral Agreement and the Plaintiffs have failed to
overcome the trial court's findings in support thereof.
This Court has held, "[w]hen we construe a statute, we first explore its plain
language and use other modes of interpretation only if the language contains
ambiguities." DeLand v. Uintah County, 945 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah App., 1997) citing Gull
Lab.. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 936 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah Ct.App.1997). The
statute at issue states, "[t]he cost of the maintenance of the fence shall also be
apportioned between each party based upon the amount of land enclosed." UT. CODE
ANN. § 4-26-5.1 (4). In the instant case, the Opening Brief is crowded with addenda for
this Court's review in determining the Legislature's intent behind UT. CODE ANN. §4-265.1. However, the Legislature's intent is unnecessary as the statute's plain language is
unambiguous.
The plain meaning of the phrase "based upon the amount of land enclosed" does
not mean the distance of the linear boundary but plainly means the amount of land
enclosed in the Wilberg property to the north compared to the amount enclosed in the
Nielsen property and the amount of land enclosed by the Wilberg property to the south
compared to the amount enclosed in Nielsen property. Such a formula is consistent with
the plain reading of "the amount of land enclosed" by the fence. The Plaintiffs' reading of
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the statute is not supported by the plain reading and meaning UT. CODE ANN. § 4-26-5.1,
which does not include any language regarding the linear distance of a fence.
The Utah Supreme Court has held, "[w]hen reviewing a district court's findings of
fact on appeal, we do not undertake an independent assessment of the evidence presented
during the course of trial and reach our own separate findings with respect to that
evidence." 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat Inc., 2004 UT 72, ^ 75, 99 P.3d 801. In the
instant case, the Plaintiffs argue the Judgment is against the clear weight of evidence at
trial. While the Plaintiffs have set forth evidence in support of their arguments on appeal,
equally credible evidence exists to support the trial court's ultimate determinations in this
matter. See, 438 Main Street at Tf 75. Furthermore, any burden by the Plaintiffs to
overcome this appellate hurdle has not been met. This Court has been presented with
evidence that only support the Plaintiffs' version of events.
This Court has recently held, "a party cannot take advantage of an error committed
at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error." Braun v. Nevada
Chemicals, Inc., 2010 UT App. 188, If 15, 236 P.3d 176 citing Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT
41, f 17, 164 P.3d 366. In the instant case, the Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by
determining the future maintenance contributions from each party. However, the
Plaintiffs' position on this issue below invited error due to their lack of evidence
submitted trial and failure to argue it before the trial court.
ARGUMENT
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I.

THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PRESERVE ISSUES RAISED ON
APPEAL.

UTAH R.APR P. 24(a)(5) requires a statement of the issues presented for review
with the standard of review, as well as citation to the record showing the issue was
preserved in the trial court or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not
preserved in the trial court. The preservation rule "is based on the premise that, 'in the
interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to address a
claim error and, if appropriate, correct it.'" State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ^ 33, 122 P.3d 543
citing State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346. Thus, "[a]s a general rule, claims
not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." Id. citing Holgate.
"This preservation rule has been extended to apply to every claim unless a [party]
can demonstrate that exceptional circumstances exist or plain error occurred." State ex
rel. D.B.. 2010 UT App. I l l , ^[6, 231 P.3d 819 citing Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App. 192,
^23, 186 P.3d 978. Thus, "[ijssues that are not raised at trial are generally deemed to be
waived." Id. citing 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat Inc., 2004 UT 72, 1J51, 99 R3d 978.
Accordingly, "[t]he presence of a constitutional issue does not excuse an appellant from
complying with the preservation rules set by the supreme court and the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure." Id. citing O'Deav. Plea, 2009 UT 46,118, 217 P.3d 704.
"For a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error 4(1) the issue
must be raised in a timely fashion[,] (2) the issue must be specifically raisedf,] and (3) the
25
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.'" 438
Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, f51 9 99 P.3d 801 citing Brookside Mobile
Home Park, Ltd. V. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ^[14, 48 P.3d 968 quoting Badger v. Brooklyn
Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah, 1998).
In the instant case, the Plaintiffs for the first time argue the issue of the future
determination of the cost of rebuilding the North Fence was a moot issue because the trial
court did not have the real parties in interest before it. Opening Brief at p. 33. This seems
to be a tangent to the real argument for the Plaintiffs, as the Plaintiffs then argue the
future maintenance contributions issue was hotly contested as evidenced by the Wilbergs'
objections to the Nielsens' first set of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Opening
Brief at p. 34; see, R0139. The Plaintiffs argue their proposed formula was attached to
their objection. Opening Brief at p. 34. The Plaintiffs therefore request the future costs
associated with the North Fence be declared moot due to the change in ownership or,
alternatively, this Court correct the apportionment f#mula so as to be in compliance with
Section 4-26-5.1(3) for new fence construction and Section 4-26-5.1(4) for fence repairs
and general maintenance. Opening Brief at p. 36.
The Plaintiffs also argue the trial court failed to address the Wilbergs' alternative
claim for damages for breach of the fencing agreement under Section 4-26-5, as the trial
court found the North Fence was adequate to restrain cattle. The Plaintiffs again pick and
choose the evidence to support their position. The Plaintiffs ignore the trial court's
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determination this issue had not been properly evidenced at trial, which is the Plaintiffs'
failure and not the trial court's.
Moreover, these issues were never properly brought before the trial court, which is
particularly evidenced by the trial and Hearing in this matter. At trial, the trial court asked
opposing counsel whether it had the figures for the fence boundary between the parties,
to which opposing counsel answered, "[y]ou do not have those figures." Tr. at p. 484. At
the Hearing, the Wilbergs argued Section 4-26-5.1 required a determination of each
party's parcel by their boundary and determine what benefit the fence becomes in their
boundaries. Hrg. Tr. at p. 8. Counsel herein objected to this argument, since this argument
had not been presented to the trial court before and would therefore allow the Wilbergs a
second bite at the apple. Id. The trial court agreed, indicating it had already ruled, stating,
"I came up with the percentages based upon the evidence that was offered that day, didn't
I? Unless there was something that I did at trial that - in other words, I'm not going to go
back through and reopen that whole issue." Id. Counsel for the Wilbergs responded,
"[n]o, Your Honor." Id. The trial court continued, "I think I ruled upon what was
presented. If there's something in that order that was unclear, then I'm happy to look at
that. But the minute entry evidently didn't think it was unclear because I allocated
percentages, didn't I?" Id. Throughout the Hearing, the trial court consistently informed
opposing counsel that the argument should have been made at trial and the purpose of the
Hearing was to ensure the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law conformed to
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the oral findings. Hrg. Tr. at p. 8, 9, 12, 14, 24, and 27. Furthermore, the trial court
indicated to opposing counsel a post-judgment motion was the appropriate route to take
to determine whether to reopen the issue. Hrg. Tr. at p. 14.
Therefore, pursuant to UTAH R.APP. P. 24(a)(5), the Plaintiffs have failed to
preserve the issue of future determinations of the rebuilding or maintenance of the North
Fence. The Plaintiffs have not demonstrated how they preserved this issue and the trial
court itself indicated this was not argued, briefed, or evidenced at trial and was
appropriately brought by post-judgment motion. The Plaintiffs have not abided by orderly
procedure, which is to give to the trial court to address the claim of error. Cruz at ^f 33.
The Plaintiffs have not demonstrated how this lack of preservation escapes the
preservation rule, particularly since they have not argued exceptional circumstances exist
or plain error occurred. D.B. at ^6. This Court should note the Plaintiffs had the
opportunity to raise the issue at trial and could have argued this approach at trial but did
not do so. Hence, the issue must be deemed waived by this Court. Id. The Utah Supreme
Court and the Rules of Appellate Procedure have articulated the procedure for
preservation of issues, which the Plaintiffs have not complied with. Accordingly, their
claim for review on these issues should be declined by this Court.
II.

THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY BRIEF ISSUES
RAISED ON APPEAL.

This Court has held, "[w]e will review an issue only if the appealing party's brief
28
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

provides '(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court;
or (B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial
court.'" State v. Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App. 191, ^ 9, 186 P.3d 1023 citing UTAH
R.APP.

P. 24(a)(5). Further, Rule 24(a)(9) requires argument of the issues raised.
The Utah Supreme Court has held the following:
We have long held that we have discretion to not address an inadequately
briefed argument. See, e.g., Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 770
(Utah 1987). Rather, a party "must plead his claims with sufficient
specificity for this court to make a ruling on the merits." Allen v. Friel,
2008 UT 56,1| 9, 194 P.3d 903. "[W]e will not assume [a party's] 'burden of
argument and research.' " Id. (quoting Treffv. Hinckley, 2001 UT 50, If 11,
26 P.3d 212).In addition to sufficient development of the argument and
citation to legal authority, a party must also "provide the appellate court
with the parts of the record that are central to the determination o f the
issue. Id. Tf lO.Relevant parts of the record may include "findings of fact
and conclusions of law [or] the transcript of the court's oral decision."
UTAH R.APP. P. 24(a)( 11 )(C).

Angel Investors. LLC v. Garritv, 2009 UT 40, Tf 35, 216 R3d 944 (footnotes included).
This Court has further held, "[b]riefs that are not in compliance with Rule 24 [of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure] may be disregarded or stricken sua sponte by the court.
Briefs must contain reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority." State v. Sloan,
2003 UT App. 170, % 13, 72 P.3d 138 citim Smith v. Smith. 1999 UT App. 370 1J8, 995
P.2d 14. Further, "[a]n issue is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue
is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court." Id.
Additionally, "[i]mplicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but
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development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority... [T]his court
is not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research." Spencer v. Pleasant View City, 2003 UT App. 379, ]f20, 80 P.3d 546 citing
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah, 1998).
In the instant case, the Plaintiffs raised issue with the constitutionality of Section
4-26-5.1, but did not brief or argue this issue in the remainder of the brief. The Plaintiffs
also raised issue of how the same statute discriminated against large property owners, but
this issue was also lacking in the brief. Inasmuch as any issue raised by the Plaintiffs was
not completely argued with appropriate legal authority and analysis, this Court should
decline to address them.
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs raise issue with the statutory interpretation with UT.
CODE ANN. 4-26-5.1 and includes legal authority for this issue; however, no analysis of
this authority is located within the Opening Brief. See, Opening Brief at pp. 13-20. The
Plaintiffs rely a great deal on the legislative intent; however, such intent is moot unless
the language is ambiguous as argued below, which was not argued by the Plaintiffs in the
Opening Brief.
The Plaintiffs were required to provide this Court with a citation to the record
showing the issue was preserved and a statement of grounds for seeking review of the
issue if it was not preserved with the trial court. Chavez-Espinoza at \9. The Plaintiffs did
not plead their claims with sufficient specificity for this Court to make a ruling thereon.
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Angel Investors at f35. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have raised these issues and prayed for
relief but have assigned the task of argument and research to this Court. Id. The Plaintiffs
have raised issues absent any argument, analysis, legal authority, or citation to the record
that would be central to the determination of these issues. See, id. In short, the Plaintiffs
have dumped the burden of argument and research upon this Court, which is noncompliant with UT. R. APR P. 24. Thus, this Court should not address these inadequately
briefed issues.
HI.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE
EXISTENCE OF A CONTRACT, WHICH THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE
FAILED TO OVERCOME.

The Utah Supreme Court has long held, "[l]iberty of contract does not mean the
right to make any kind of contract with any body but merely the right to make contracts
with competent persons on a plane of relative parity or freedom of choice, and within the
limits allowed or not forbidden by law." McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203,
85 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1938). The Utah Supreme Court has held, "[i]t is well established
in the law that unexpressed intentions do not affect the validity of a contract." Jaramillo v.
Farmers Ins. Group, 669 R2d 1231, 1233 (Utah, 1983) citing Allen v. Bissinger & Co., 62
Utah 226, 219 P. 539, 541-42 (1923). The Utah Supreme Court has stated the following:
The apparent mutual assent of the parties, essential to the formation of a
contract, must be gathered by the language employed by them, and the law
imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning
of its words and acts. It judges of his intentions by his outward expressions
and excludes all questions in regard to his unexpressed intention. If his
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words or acts judged by reasonable standard manifests an intention to agree
to the matter in question, that agreement is established and it is immaterial
what may be the real but unexpressed state of his mind upon the subject.
Donovan v. McGurrin, 69 Utah 1, 251 P. 1067, 1070 (Utah 1926).
Partial performance on a contract is found when "(1) the oral contract and its terms
are clear and definite, (2) the acts done in performing the contract are equally clear and
definite, and (3) the acts are in substantial reliance on the oral contract." Jenkins v.
Percival 962 P.2d 796, 801 (Utah, 1998) citinz Martin v. Scholl 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah
1983); Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 18, 24, 305 P.2d 480, 484 (1956).
Any reliance upon an oral contract is necessarily determined by the evidence. See, Martin
v. Scholl 678 P.2d 274 (Utafcul983).
In respect to the trial court's determination the parties had an oral contract
concerning the fences, the Opening Brief first argues no contract existed between the
parties. See, Opening Brief at pp. 20-25. The Wilbergs argue their Complaint relied upon
UT. CODE ANN. 4-26-5 or, in the alternative, -5.1(3) as amended in 2004. Id. at p. 22.
However, the Wilbergs acknowledge the Complaint alleged the parties entered into an
oral agreement concerning the fences. Id. The Wilbergs argue the parties had a brief
telephone conversation about the parties' cattle trespassing back and forth over the
fences. Id. The Wilbergs allege their version of events, that Ross Wilberg agreed to build
a new fence on the south boundary and Chris Nielsen agreed to build a new fence on the
north boundary. Id. The Complaint alleged the Nielsens had breached the agreement by
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failing to do anything at all respecting the building of a fence. Id.
However, in making these arguments, the Plaintiffs rely upon only the parts of the
record that are beneficial to their position and ignore the evidence that supports the
Judgment. The Plaintiffs make much of the fact that the Nielsens denied the existence of
the Oral Agreement; however, the record clearly shows the Nielsens and the Wilbergs
asserted the existence of the Oral Agreement at trial. See,; Tr. at pp. 26-27 (Ross Wilberg
testified he told Chris to take the North Fence and Ross would take the South Fence); Tr.
at p. 95 (Chris Nielsen testified Ross proposed he would build the South Fence and that
Chris would build the North Fence, to which Chris responded, "whatever"); Tr. at pp.
510-511 (In closing arguments, counsel herein asserted the existence of the Oral
Agreement).
Furthermore, the trial court based its determination of the existence of the Oral
Agreement due to the common practice between the parties, which was to retrieve the
cattle when they got out and repair the fence. Tr. at p. 519. The trial court's determination
of the Oral Agreement was based upon the testimony of both parties, which was that the
Wilbergs were responsible for the cost of the South Fence and the Nielsens' responsible
for the cost of the North Fence. Tr. at p. 520. Further, the parties' subsequent conduct
supported the existence of the Oral Agreement. Id. Ross Wilberg testified he began to
immediately repair and rebuild the South Fence; however, the South Fence was not
completed before the Nielsens' repaired the North Fence. See, Tr. at pp. 27-28; 456-457;
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463. Thus, the Plaintiffs' contention on appeal that the Nielsens did not immediately
perform on the provisions of the Oral Agreement rings hallow.
Furthermore, the fact that both Ross Wilberg and Chris Nielsen are expert
cattlemen and experienced ranchers implies the reasoning behind the Oral Agreement that
the North and South Fence needed to be adequate to contain the cattle and common to the
area, which was thoroughly established at trial by both parties. Furthermore, Ross
Wilberg admitted the parties did not discuss any standard for the fence but initiated the
action before completing the South Fence and continued with the action after the
Nielsens' completed the North Fence.
The unexpressed intentions of the parties do not affect the validity of the Oral
Agreement. Jaramillo at 1233. Ross testified the conversation surrounding the Oral
Agreement was heated and testified Chris Nielsen was difficult to get along with;
however, the problem of the Wilberg cattle trespassing onto the Nielsens' property had to
be addressed between these neighbors. Consequently, the mutual assent to rebuild the
North and South Fence of Ross Wilberg and Chris Nielsen can be gathered from their
telephone conversation, of which both testified similarly to, and from their subsequent
conduct. Donovan at 1070. Thus, this Court must impute to the parties an intention
corresponding to the reasonable meaning of their words and acts. Id. The words and acts
by the parties in this matter, which was judged by the trial court's reasonable standard,
manifested an intention to repair and/or rebuild the North and South Fence to contain
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cattle and to conform with fences common to the area. See, id.
The Oral Agreement was clear and definite. The fence at issue required repair.
Ross Wilberg and Chris Nielsens' testimony at trial both evidenced the Wilbergs would
take the South Fence and the Nielsens would take the North Fence. Standards for the
fence was not discussed; however, due to the experience of the parties, each party built or
rebuilt an adequate fence, which was supported by the expert, Cash Winn, whose
testimony was relied upon by the trial court in making its Judgment. Accordingly, the
Oral Agreement in this matter was clear and definite in its terms. Jenkins at 801.
The acts in performing the Oral Agreement were equally clear and definite.
Shortly after the Oral Agreement, the Wilbergs began to build the South Fence. Both
parties testified at trial respecting the materials and effort that are required to repair
and/or construct an adequate fence. Cash Winn testified both the South and North Fence
were adequate fences, meaning the effort by both parties was clear and definite and the
acts were performed in substantial reliance upon the Oral Agreement. Jenkins at 801.
The Plaintiffs argue the Nielsens' repair of the North Fence after the
commencement of the action renders the Oral Agreement invalid. Opening Brief at p. 24.
However, the Plaintiffs neglect the testimony of Ross Wilberg that was uncontroverted at
trial, which was the Nielsens finished the North Fence before the Wilbergs finished the
South Fence. See, Tr. at p. 456-457. Hence, the Plaintiffs argument on this point falls
short.
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The Plaintiffs argue the "alleged agreement" was not clear enough to be valid.
Opening Brief at p. 25. However, the Plaintiffs again ignore substantial testimony in
making this leap. The parties in this case have extensive backgrounds as cattlemen and
ranchers. This knowledge and experience evidences an implied agreement that the North
and South Fences would contain cattle, particularly due to the events leading up to the
heated conversation surrounding the Oral Agreement. If the Wilbergs desired to collect
upon the Vi cost of Section 4-26-5.1 (2), the Wilbergs should have discussed the enhanced
standards they required. However, they did not do so, and their claim the Oral Agreement
is unenforceable necessarily fails.
Furthermore, the Opening Brief misconstrues the Complaint in this matter. The
Complaint was primarily based upon the Oral Agreement and the remedy sought was
based upon Section 4-26-5.1. The argument that the Oral Agreement is unenforceable
was not preserved and was not argued below. This position is wholly contrary to the
Plaintiffs' position at trial, which was the Plaintiffs relied upon the Oral Agreement and
began to rebuild the South Fence.
The Wilbergs did not seek damages, only the cost of constructing the North Fence.
See, Addendum "A". This was plainly acknowledged by the trial court, to which the
Plaintiffs have not challenged and conveniently ignored in the Opening Brief, as follows:
In this case we've had a civil action that's been brought but there's been no
damages that have been claimed. Plaintiffs haven't brought a claim that that
fence has not been maintained and has caused some damages. They haven't
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asserted, for example, this would be an example, that cattle have gotten into
the alfalfa and have actually bloated. They talked about that risk and I
acknowledge that risk but I don't think there's been any damages that have
been shown as a result of any problem with the north fence.
Tr. at p. 529.
Additionally, the Plaintiffs argue the Nielsens cannot rely upon the Oral
Agreement since they did not commence construction on the North Fence until after the
filing of the action as this evidences a "first breach". Opening Brief at p. 25. Such
argument is without merit, particularly since the Plaintiffs conveniently omit the fact the
Nielsens finished the North Fence before the Wilbergs completed the South Fence. See,
Tr. at pp. 456-457. The Plaintiffs were the party asserting the existence of the Oral
Agreement below and cannot now shift their position as it suits them, particularly since
the trial court was unable to first determine this argument.
The Plaintiffs baldly argue the trial court had all of the information necessary to
enter an award for the cost of the South Fence, due to Ross Wilberg and Shane
Campbell's testimony. Opening Brief at p. 29. However, the Plaintiffs ignore the trial
court's determination of Campbell's diminished credibility, since he was well acquainted
with the Wilbergs. Further, the trial court plainly indicated it did not have the figures
opposing counsel argued it had in closing arguments. See, Tr. at p. 484.
The Plaintiffs argue this Court cannot find the Nielsens performed any of the terms
of the Oral Agreement since such a finding would be clearly erroneous and not in
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conformity with the Nielsens' own testimony. Opening Brief at p. 30. However, this
argument flies in the face of the evidence at trial, whereat the Nielsens' asserted the
existence of the Oral Agreement and testified to the terms as well as the Wilbergs. In
sum, the Plaintiffs fall short of overcoming the trial court's conclusion the existence of
the Oral Agreement, particularly in light of all the evidence in support of the Judgment
and the trial court's ability to afford the evidence particular weight in its findings.
IV.

THE STATUTE IS UNAMBIGUOUS.

The Utah Supreme Court has recently upheld, "[a]s we have so often said, when
interpreting a statute, we look first to the statute's plain language." Arnold v. Grigsby,
2009 UT 88, t 19, 225 P.3d 192 citing Evans v. State. 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998).
This Court has held, "[w]hen we construe a statute, we first explore its plain language
and use other modes of interpretation only if the language contains ambiguities." DeLand
v. Uintah County, 945 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah App., 1997) citing Gull Lab., Inc. v. Utah State
Tax Comm'n, 936 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah Ct.App.1997). Deland continues, "Unless a
literal reading would render the statute's wording unreasonably inoperable or confusing,
we accord the wording its usual and accepted meaning and do not look beyond plain and
unambiguous language to ascertain legislative intent." Id. quoting US Xpress, Inc. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 886 P.2d 1115, 1117 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (internal quotations
omitted).
Legislative intent is discerned by the statute's plain language. LPI Services v.
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McGee, 2009 UT 41,1] H,215P.3d 135 citing Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 2007 UT 42, U 46, 164 P.3d 384. LH continues as
follows:

.

"We read the plain language of the statute as a whole[ ] and interpret its
provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related
chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, \ 17, 66 P.3d 592. When the plain
meaning of the statute can be discerned from its language, no other
interpretive tools are needed. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster/Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42, lj 47, 164 P.3d 384. However, "a
court should not follow the literal language of a statute if its plain meaning
works an absurd result." Savage v. Utah Youth Village, 2004 UT 102, f 18,
104 P.3d 1242. "[I]f the language is ambiguous, the court may look beyond
the statute to legislative history ... to ascertain the statute's intent."
Martinez, 2007 UT 42, % Al, 164 P.3d 384.

The Utah Supreme Court has determined "ambiguous" to mean capable of two or
more plausible meanings. Alf v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274
(Utah, 1993); see also Epperson v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 949 P.2d 779, 783, fn. 6,
(Utah App., 1997). However, ambiguity does not arise simply because one party seeks to
endow differing interpretations according to his or her own interests. Id.
The statute at issue herein states the following:
(2) A qualified landowner may require the qualified adjoining landowner to
pay for 1/2 of the cost of the fence if: (a) the fence is or becomes a partition
fence separating the qualified landowner's land from that belonging to the
qualified adjoining landowner; (b) the cost is reasonable for that type of
fence; (c) that type of fence is commonly found in that particular area; and
(d) the construction of the fence is no more expensive than the cost for
posts, wire, and connectors.
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UT. CODE ANN. § 4-26-5.1 (2). The statute continues, "[i]f the qualified adjoining
landowner refuses, the qualified landowner may maintain a civil action against the
qualified adjoining landowner for 1/2 of the cost of that portion of the fence." UT. CODE
ANN. § 4-26-5.1 (3). Further, "[t]he cost of the maintenance of the fence shall also be
apportioned between each party based upon the amount of land enclosed." UT. CODE
ANN. §4-26-5.1(4).
In the instant case, the Opening Brief is crowded with addenda for this Court's
review in determining the Legislature's intent behind UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1.
However, the Legislature's intent is unnecessary as the statute's plain language is
unambiguous and evidence outside the record on appeal should not be considered. See,
State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, f 7, 974 P.2d 279 (An appellate court's "review is ... limited to
the evidence contained in the record on appeal.").
In determining that the parties contracted around the provisions of UT. CODE ANN.
§ 4-26-5.1, the trial court simply upheld the terms of the Oral Agreement, which was the
Wilbergs would bear the cost of the South Fence and the Nielsens would bear the cost of
the North Fence. The trial court then determined future maintenance according to the
plain language of the statute. UT. CODE ANN. § 4-26-5.1 (2) is not required to be applied
to all cases, or else it would have included "shall" in place of "may".
However, the trial court indicated the difficulty with this case was that the issue
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was not about the total of acreage enclosed, it was about the fences at issue not meeting.
Tr. at p. 491. The trial court indicated it had two (2) separate fences to look at and would
v
take the total amount of what the Nielsens own since that would be the amount being
protected by the North Fence. Id. The trial court stated, "[t]hey're two separate fences
and the statute can only be applied by following that formula for both fences. That's the
only way it makes any sense." Tr. at p. 492. The trial court stated its understanding and
reading of the statute meant that if a fence is protecting one landowner substantially more
because there is a larger herd putting pressure on the fence, then it is fair for the larger
landowner to pay a larger proportion of the fence cost. Tr. at pp. 495-496. Thus, the trial
court determined its formula as follows:
Isn't it possible for me simply to take a look at the amount enclosed in the
Wilberg property on the north, compare that to the amount enclosed in the
Nielsen property and determine then that that is the apportionment for the
north fence? Do the same thing and say what is the amount of property
owned by the Wilbergs on the south, determine that that then needs to be
compared with the amount of the Nielsen property and that would be the
apportionment on the south, for the south fence? And those are your two
numbers.
Tr. at p. 483.
UT. CODE ANN. § 4-26-5.1 (2) does not automatically direct a qualified landowner
to pay for one half (lA) the cost of the fence. The statute states "may" and not "shall",
which lends a reading that, in certain circumstances, a qualified landowner could petition
for one half the cost. It does not follow that, in every situation, a qualified landowner
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would be entitled to half the cost of a fence. Further, it is unfair for a large property
owner to be entitled to half the cost of a fence from a small property owner. In any event,
the Oral Agreement negated the application of UT. CODE ANN. § 4-26-5.1 (2).
The Plaintiffs first failed to raise the issue that the trial court should have
apportioned the fences' linear boundary distance and not by the acreage of the parties'
enclosed parcels. However, the Plaintiffs have also failed to demonstrate how this
definition could be a plausible meaning according to the plain language of the statute,
which reads, "[t]he cost of the maintenance of the fence shall also be apportioned
between each party based upon the amount of land enclosed." UT. CODE ANN. § 4-26-5.1
(4); see, Alf at 1274 and Arnold at ^f 19. It is noteworthy that this subsection of the statute
does use "shall", thereby limiting a trial court's determination of this issue. The phrase
"based upon the amount of land enclosed" does not indicate the distance of the linear
boundary but plainly indicates the amount of land enclosed in the Wilberg property to the
north compared to the amount enclosed in the Nielsen property and the amount of land
enclosed by the Wilberg property to the south compared to the amount enclosed in
Nielsen property. Such a formula is consistent with the plain reading of "the amount of
land enclosed" by the fence. The Plaintiffs' reading of the statute is not supported by the
plain reading and meaning UT. CODE ANN. § 4-26-5.1, which does not include any
language regarding the linear distance of a fence. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' meaning of
UT. CODE ANN. § 4-26-5.1 fails because it does not provide this Court with a plausible
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meaning since the language the Plaintiff relies upon is gapingly absent from the statute
itself. Alf at 1274. Further, ambiguity does not exist simply because the Plaintiffs seek to
endow a differing interpretation according to their own interests. Id.
The literal reading of UT. CODE ANN. § 4-26-5.1 does not render it unreasonably
inoperable or confusing. Deland at 174. The trial court appropriately applied the plain
meaning of the statute as it pertained to future maintenance of the North and South
Fences and arrived to a just apportionment. Hence, this Court must accord the wording of
the statute its usual and accepted meaning and should not look beyond the plain and
unambiguous language to ascertain legislative intent. Id. As such, the legislative history
included in the Opening Brief is unneeded, particularly since the plain meaning of UT.
CODE ANN.

V.

§ 4-26-5.1 does not work an absurd result. LPI at If 11.
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED THE FINDINGS
AND CONCLUSIONS ARE AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF
THE EVIDENCE.

The Utah Supreme Court has held, "[w]hen reviewing a district court's findings of
fact on appeal, we do not undertake an independent assessment of the evidence presented
during the course of trial and reach our own separate findings with respect to that
evidence." 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72,1f 75, 99 P.3d 801. "Rather,
we endeavor only to evaluate whether the court's findings are so lacking in support that
they are against the clear weight of the evidence." Id. citing Young v. Young, 1999 UT
38,115,979R2d338.
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The Utah Supreme Court has also held, "[w]hen parties appeal a court's factsensitive use of its discretionary powers, they 'must successfully challenge the factual
findings upon which the trial court's decision ... depended.'" United Park City Mines Co.
v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ^ 37, 140 P.3d 1200 citing Chen v.
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, n. 14, 100 P.3d 1177. This Court must also bestow due
consideration to the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses, which is vital to the
basis of this Court's repeated holdings that, "[findings of fact will not be set aside unless
they are against the clear weight of the evidence and clearly erroneous." Glauser Storage,
L.L.C. v. Smedley, 2001 UT App. 141, If 15, 27 P.3d 565 citing Coalville City v.
Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1209-10 (Utah Ct.App.), cert, denied, 939 P.2d 683 (Utah
1997).
Thus, "[successful challenges to findings of fact must demonstrate to appellate
courts first how the trial court found the facts from the evidence, and second why such
findings contradict the weight of the evidence." State in the Interest of S.T., 928 P.2d 393,
400 (Utah App., 1996) citing Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, Inc.,
872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah App. 1994). Further, "[successful challenges can also 'induce
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" Id. citing State ex rel.
N.H.B., 777 P.2d 487, 493 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989).
In the instant case, the Plaintiffs argue the Judgment is against the clear weight of
evidence at trial. While the Plaintiffs have set forth evidence in support of their
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arguments on appeal, equally credible evidence exists to support the trial court's ultimate
determinations in this matter. See, 438 Main Street at ^f 75. Furthermore, any burden by
the Plaintiffs to overcome this appellate hurdle has not been met. This Court has been
presented with evidence that only support the Plaintiffs' version of events. The Plaintiffs
have completely ignored the evidence that supports the Judgment and have failed to
challenge the trial court's findings or discretion that would render the Judgment fatal on
appeal. Accordingly, this neglect and failure does not establish Judgment in this matter as
against the clear weight of the evidence at trial and in fact further support the soundness
of the Judgment.
On appeal, this Court does not undertake an independent assessment of the
evidence presented during the course of trial and reach its own separate findings with
respect to that evidence. 438 Main Street at f75. The findings in this matter were made
upon sound evidence and are not lacking in support. Id. The support for the Judgment is
clearly articulated by the Statement of Facts herein. Thus, the Judgment is not against the
clear weight of the evidence in this matter. Id.
The nature of the Plaintiffs' challenge in this regard is a challenge to the trial
court's fact-sensitive use of its discretionary powers and thus they must successfully
challenge the factual findings upon which the trial court's decision depended, which the
Plaintiffs have failed to do. United Park City Mines at Tf37. The Plaintiffs have further
failed to adequately marshal the evidence by first demonstrating to this Court how the
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trial court found the facts from the evidence and then by showing why such findings
contradict the weight of the evidence. S.T. at 400. In this case, the Plaintiffs only argue
the facts from a light most favorable to them, which is fatal in a fact sensitive challenge.
Therefore, the Judgment in this matter is not against the clear weight of the evidence as
the Plaintiffs' challenge does not induce a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made. Id.
VL

THE PLAINTIFFS INVITED ERROR.

This Court has recently held, "a party cannot take advantage of an error committed
at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error." Braun v. Nevada
Chemicals, Inc., 2010 UT App. 188, T| 15, 236 P.3d 176 citing Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT
41, f 17, 164 P.3d 366. The invited error doctrine is based upon two (2) reasons: "[f]irst,
it fortifies our long-established policy that the trial court should have the first opportunity
to address the claim of error. Second, it discourages parties from intentionally misleading
the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal." Id. citing State v.
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54, 70 P.3d 111. Accordingly, "[t]he invited error doctrine
precludes an appellate court from considering an issue on appeal that was not only
unobjected to in the trial court, but was in fact submitted by argument, thereby depriving
the court of the opportunity to correct any error." Mack v. Utah State Dept. of Commerce,
Division of Securities, 2009 UT 47, ]f 15, 221 P.3d 194 citing State v. Winfield, 2006 UT
4, If 14, 128 R3d 1171.
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The Utah Supreme Court has held, "parties are 'not entitled to both the benefit of
not objecting at trial and the benefit of objecting on appeal.'" Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT
41, If 17,.164 P.3d 366 citing State v. King, 2006 UT 3, \ 13, 131 P.3d 202. Generally, for
a party to be determined to have invited error, the party must have made an affirmative
representation to the trial court. Id. at ^f 18.
In the instant case, the Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by determining the
future maintenance contributions from each party. The Plaintiffs argue the trial court
should have relied upon the linear boundary lines and not the acreage enclosed by the
fences. However, even if the Plaintiffs are correct in this argument, they invited any error
as a result due to the evidence submitted at trial by the Plaintiffs and lack of argument at
that time.
When asked about this issue at closing arguments at trial, opposing counsel was
unable to show the trial court the language of the statute that would allow such a reading
in support of her position that UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1 intended the linear distance of
the fence and not the amount enclosed by the fence. Tr. at pp. 481-482. The trial court
plainly outlined its approach to this matter in determining apportionment, by stating the
following:
Isn't it possible for me simply to take a look at the amount enclosed in the
Wilberg property on the north, compare that to the amount enclosed in the
Nielsen property and determine then that that is the apportionment for the
north fence? Do the same thing and say what is the amount of property
owned by the Wilbergs on the south, determine that that then needs to be
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compared with the amount of the Nielsen property and that would be the
apportionment on the south, for the south fence? And those are your two
numbers.
Tr. at p. 483. The trial court asked opposing counsel whether it had the figures for the
fence boundary between the parties, to which opposing counsel answered, "[y]ou do not
have those figures." Tr. at p. 484.
By submitting the evidence in this matter in the manner performed by the
Plaintiffs and failing to submit any figures for the fence boundary between the parties, the
Plaintiffs cannot now plead error on appeal. The Plaintiffs failed to submit the required
evidence they now claim caused error; this strategy cannot now be turned around to the
Plaintiffs' benefit on appeal. See, Braun at If 15. As already argued herein, the Plaintiffs
first failed to argue this position before the trial court and thus this issue is unpreserved.
Moreover, the Plaintiffs appear to have mislead the trial court so as to preserve a hidden
ground for appeal. Id. The failure of the Plaintiffs at trial to attempt to rectify the trial
court's approach to the future maintenance contributions without following the proper
procedure for doing so cannot now be objected to on appeal when the Plaintiffs led the
trial court into error, should error exist. Accordingly, this Court should decline to review
the future maintenance contributions, as they have been appropriately determined at trial.
/
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CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the Neilsens respectfully request this Court affirm the trial court
in this matter and deny the challenges made by the Appellants in this matter.

DATED THIS | 0 _ day of October, 2010

Michael D. Olsen
Attorney for Chris Nielsen and Sunny J. Neilsen
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•TOANE: PAPPAS WHITE #3445
Attorney for Plaintiffs
10 West Main
PO Box 754
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: 435-637-0177
Facsimile: 435-637-0183

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CCW RANCH, an LLC, CLAY
WILBERG and ROSS WILBERG,
as members of said LLC, and
individually,

COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. 00,0706003
CHRIS and SUNNY J NIELSEN,

Judge Srucc £• tlaJIidtu*
Defendants.

COME now CLAY WILBERG and ROSS WILBERG and CCW RANCH, LLC,
a Utah limited liability company, by and through their attorney,
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE, and hereby allege as follows:
' 1.

Plaintiff CCW RANCH, LLC, is a Utah limited liability

company and is the owner of some of the cattle and all of the
following described real property located in Emery County, State
of Utah.

Clay Wilberg and Ross Wilberg are two of the members

of said limited liability company ,^and also are owners of various
S

cattle and property interests affected by this matter. The real
property which is the subject matter of this action is located
in Emery County, State of Utah, and more particularly described
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as follows:
SW/4/SW/4 SE/4;ALS0 BEG SW C0R,NW/4,SEC 12,TWP 18 S,R 8 E;'
TH E 68 RDS;N 17°16'E 185 FT;N 29°09'W 1030 FT/N 68°25'W 36
RDS;S 71 RDS TO BEG.ALSO BEG N/4 COR;S 2640 FT;W 1320 FT;N
490 FT;NE'LY 840 FT;W 250 FT;N 660 FT;E 240 FT;NE'LY TO SEC
LINE;E 796 FT TO GEG. 298.96 ACRES.

SE/4 NW/4;SW/4 NE/4,SEC 13,TWP 18 S,R 8 E. ALSO BEG SE
COR,NW/4 NE/4;N 26.33 RDS/W 240 RDS; S 26.33 RDS;E 240 RDS
TO BEG.ALSO BEG NW COR, NE/4 SW/4;S 1285 FT;N 89°33'39"E
973.12 FT; N 89°29'56"E 1180.80 FT;N 89°18'31"E 548.25 FT;N
89°22'17"E 918.22 FT;N 77°00'53/,E 417.38 FT TO E SEC LINE;N
1191.20 FT M/L TO 1/4 LINE;W 3960 FT M/L TO BEG.ALSO BEG SE
COR,NE/4 SE/4;N 35.50 FT;S 78°44'23"W 189.98 FT;E 155.93 FT
TO BEG. 240.32 ACRES.
2.

The

Defendants,

CHRIS

and

SUNNY

NIELSEN

hereafter

collectively know as NIELSENS, also own real property located in
Emery County, State of Utah, and more particularly described as
follows:
BEG NE COR,NW/4 NE/4,SEC 13,TWP 18 S,R 8 E;S 879.95 FT;W
3720 FT M/L TO E'LY BNDRY LINE OF HWY 10;NE'LY ALONG HWY
10,930 FT M/L TO SEC LINE;E 3430 FT M/L TO BEG.ALSO E/2
NE/4. 152.9 ACRES
3.
WILBERG

The NIELSEN property is a strip which runs through the
property

boundaries,

namely,

and

said

a north

neighbors
property

share
boundary

property boundary to the NIELSEN* property
WILBERG property,

** .

two
and

property
a

south

as it bisects the

^

\

4.

Said boundaries have had historical

fences of long

duration in place as markers of the property boundaries and said
fences have been jointly maintained and owned by these adjacent
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property owners for many years.
5.

The WILBERGS have historically repaired fences and in*

recent years the NIELSENS have failed to repair their fences.
6.

Approximately eighteen

(18) months ago, ROSS WILBERG

initiated a telephonic communication with CHRIS NIELSEN in which
it was agreed that the WILBERGS would build a new fence on the
south boundary of the NIELSENS' property and the NIELSENS would
build

a new

property.

fence

on the

north

In reliance on said

constructed almost three thousand

boundary

of

the NIELSENS'

agreement, ROSS WILBERG has
(3,000) lineal feet of new

fence dividing the south boundary of the NIELSEN property from
WILBERG property; however, the NIELSENS have refused, failed and
neglected to construct any fence as agreed upon in said oral
agreement.
1.

The NIELSENS occupy and utilize their property on a

frequent basis and have seen the construction of the WILBERG
portion of the agreed fence and have watched the WILBERGS rely
on said agreement.
8.

Additionally,

the

historic, fence

has

not

been

maintained by the NIELSENS as required by Utah Code Annotated,
Section 4-26-5.

The NIELSENS havje allowed vegetation and trees

to grow out of control and have failed to repair the fence when
their trees have fallen across and damaged same.

Additionally,

the NIELSENS have trenched ditches in an inappropriate fashion
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thereby burying the historic fence line and have failed to fix
same when advised of the problem by the WILBERGS.
9.

The WILBERGS currently graze cattle on their property.

The NIELSENS have often leased their property for the purpose of
grazing cattle and/or other livestock and have used the property
for livestock and agricultural purposes. To the best of the
Plaintiffs' information and belief, the defendants declare the
subject property as "Green Belt" and receive the tax advantages
i
;

therefore.
Utah

The parties are adjoining land owners pursuant to

Code

Annotated,

4-26-5.1

and,

in

the

event

that

the

NIELSENS do not maintain the existing fence or construct the new
fence, with or without an agreement, the WILBERGS are entitled
to create the fence pursuant to said statute and attach a lien
to the NIELSENS' property for the construction of same.
10.

At the current time, due to the NIELSENS' refusal to

complete their portion of the verbal agreement and further based
i

i

on the NIELSENS' failure to maintain the historic

fence and

further based upon the NIELSENS' failure to repair the damage
inflicted

by

their

improper

trenching

and

their

improper

maintenance of trees and vegetatipn on their property, WILBERG
cattle are currently entering th£ NIELSEN property through the
NIELSEN north boundary.

The cattle enter because the NIELSENS

have failed to maintain their fences as outlined above.
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11.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 4-26-5.1, the

WILBERGS allege the cost per lineal foot of an adequate fence
will be at least the sum of $8 plus per lineal foot.
NIELSENS

have

approximately

4,950

feet

to

construct

The
in

conformity with the oral agreement entered into by the parties
or, alternatively the NIELSENS have approximately 4,950 feet to
repair or replace pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 4-265.1.
12.
WILBERGS

Since
will

the

NIELSENS

obtain

the

have

failed

services

of

to
an

perform,
expert

the

fencing

construction company and will commence an immediate replacement
of the fence and will seek damages in an amount to be more fully
determined at the time of trial in this matter but which will be
a minimum of $39,600 dollars.
13.

In the

event

that

the NIELSENS

fail

to pay the

construction company for the fence pursuant to Section 4-26-5.1,
UCA, the WILBERGS request that this Court enter a judgment as a
lien against the NIELSEN real property so that foreclosure may
initiate

upon

same

to pay for "the fencing pursuant

statue.
14.
the

#
The NIELSENS have commenced a small claims action in

Justice Court

WILBERG

to the

and

Clay

for Emery . County, Utah
WILBERG,

alleging

that

against
the
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only Ross

NIELSENS

are

entitled to a judgment for a sum certain, namely, $1,-261.3u for
the trespass of what "'they define as "Wilberg" cattle. Wi::T;;RGS*
have challenged the jurisdiction of that court to determine the
respective interests of the parties in said real property and
any damages that may be owed as a result of the actions of said
parties.

The new simplified rules of Civil Procedure of the

Justice Court has created a situation in which the simplified
Rules actually prohibit the filing of what would be a mandatory
counterclaim under the regular Rules of Civil Procedure and the
simplified

rules direct the filing of the counterclaim as a

separate district court action.
confusing

and conflicting

The WILBERGS contend that the

rules could

result

in the Justice

Court entering a ruling or judgment in a hotly disputed property
matter

unless

this

District

Court

determines

that

it

has

exclusive original jurisdiction over matter alleged herein.
14.

The WILBERGS are entitled to an award of all court

costs and attorney's fees herein.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for relief as follows:
1-

That this Court determine that the Seventh Judicial

District Court, in and for Emery ^County, Utah has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the -subject matter of this action
and ill personam jurisdiction over- the parities hereto and that
all issues which have arisen out of the relationship between the
parties herein with

respect

to said

real property described
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herein and^tr.

ioundary fenc&s associated therev;. •;: siiould be

consolidated'L> this action pursuant to the Utah /;v..\cs of Civil
Procedure.
2.

That

the Court determine

that

the defendants have

failed to maintain and act pursuant to their oral agreement with
the Plaintiffs and that the Plaintiffs have been damaged thereby
in an amount to be more specifically proven at the time trial
but estimated to be approximately $40,000; and
3-

That the Court find that pursuant to Section 4-26-5.1,

UCA, the Plaintiffs are entitled to commence the construction of
an appropriate fence pursuant to the statute and reduce all
expenses for the construction thereof to a lien against the
NIELSEN property and that foreclosure commence thereon.
4.

That the Plaintiffs be awarded all court costs and

attorney's fees herein.
5-

For such other and further relief as the Court deems

just and equitable in the premises.
DATED this 3rd day of January, 2006.

<Z0ANE PAPPAS WHITE
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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